the basis of the pragmatic jurisprudence that Judge Posner has articulated and defended in his previous writings, this book offers an alternative justification for the Supreme Courts decision in Bush v. Gore while praising the Court for averting the chaotic consequences of an unresolved deadlock. Posner also evaluates the performance of the lawyers who conducted the post-election litigation and of the academics who commented on the unfolding drama. He argues that neither Gores nor Bushs lawyers blundered seriously, but that the reaction of the legal professoriat to the litigation exposed serious flaws in the academic practice of constitutional law. While rejecting such radical moves as abolishing the Electoral College or creating a national ballot, Posner concludes with a detailed plan of feasible reforms designed to avoid a repetition of the 2000 election fiasco. Lawyers, political scientists, pundits, and politicians are waiting to hear what Judge Posner has to say. But this book is written for and will be welcomed by all who were riveted by the recent crisis of presidential succession. >>> The Florida court used inexcusably poor reasoning and logic in saying that a voter''s error in completing a punch card ballot is a form of "error in vote tabulation" (pp 95, 116, 122) . This reasoning is a violation not just of the plain meaning of F.S. 102.166 (5) (2000), but also a violation of common sense. As Posner notes, no allegation was ever made of an error in a punch card reader (pp 62, 86).
>>> The court also created a false dilemma by saying that the statute allowing a protest for seven days after the election conflicted with the overall seven-day deadline to certify returns (p 105). Posner correctly points out that (a) if a candidate were so stupid as to wait for seven days before protesting that "the losing candidate has himself to blame for not acting faster," (b) in any event, such a delay in protest did not in fact occur with Gore so the court never should have addressed the issue in the first place and (c) a recount to review an error in the vote tabulation machines (as opposed to a review of the vote itself) could be completed within the time frame set forth in F. S. 102.166 (2000) , so the court only found this dilemma by misinterpreting what an "error in the vote tabulation" was in the first place. See F.S. 102.166(3)(a) (2000) .
>>> The court used a vague state constitutional declaration of "power is inherent to the people" (pp 100, 104-107) to ignore specific statutory language directing the Secretary of State to make determinations regarding election matters as set forth in F. S. 97.012 (2000) , in order to give Gore more time than he was authorized under the Florida statute. By doing so, the court was not only usurping legislative power by changing the plain words of the statute, it was also probably violating Art. II Sec. 2 cl. 2 of the Constitution (pp 127, 153, 155).
>>> The court ignored elemental principles of statutory construction wh en examining F.S. 102.112 (2000) (the Department of State *may* ignore untimely returns) and F.S. 102.111 (2000) (the DOS *shall* ignore untimely returns). It is a common understanding in the legal field that when two statutes have only a potential conflict, a court is to interpret them so that they do not. In this case, the Secretary of State acted in a way that created no conflict (she ignored late returns) therefore there was no need to claim a contradiction, then leverage that supposed contradiction i nto giving Gore 12 more days.
>>> Recapping, Posner points out the obvious: "The U.S. Supreme Court was criticized for intervening when it knew what effect its intervention would have on the outcome of the election. But it would not have intervened had the same principle discouraged the Florida supreme court from intervening when it knew that the effect of its intervention could only be to increase the likelihood that Gore would become president" (p 160).
Other points Posner brings out include: * The hypocrisy of Democrats proclaiming "every vote must count" while simultaneously (a) trying to disenfranchise Seminole and Martin County voters who did not have voter ID numbers due to a computer glitch (pp 98-99), (b) requesting a recount only in four coun ties (why not all? Shouldn''t every vote count?) and (c) requesting a recount of only undervotes, not overvotes (does every vote count or not?).
* The standard to review voters'' intent on punch cards that was employed by the Democrat-run Broward Canvassing Board was indefensible as a matter of law and common sense (pp 58-59, 124). The standard, which consisted of a dimpled chad, a mark or even an indentation next to the chad, supposedly was good enough to determine voter intent. Posner points out that indentations could arise from the card being passed through the machine or by being bent during handling, and that a dimpled chad could arise from voters starting to vote but changing their minds after realizing that they were voting for the wrong person. The statutory standard, even after the Florida supreme court butchered the statute, is whether there is "a clear indication of the intent of the voter." F.S. 101.5614(5) (2000) . How can anyone with a straight face say a mark or indentation alongside a chad, or even a dimpled chad, is a "clear indication"? Let''s not be silly. The sheer outrageousness of such a biased, subjective and manipulable standard is, in Posner''s opinion, why David Boies never suggested it as a standard in his legal maneuvering (p 195).
On this point Posner alludes to something (p 131) but is too diplomatic to say it explicitly: the Broward Canvassing Board could very well have altered punch cards under its standard to make a card look like a Gore vote. For example, a Democrat operative handling the punch card could press his fingernail on the chad or alongside it to make it look like a stylus had marked it. This could be done very subtly and even someone nearby would not be able to observe the fraud. Would you put it past the Democratic operatives to do something like that? I wouldn''t.
* Bush v. Gore should have been decided on Art. II Sec. 1 cl. 2 grounds (i.e., the specific grant of authority in the Constitution that directs state legislatures to appoint its electors), and not equal protection grounds that ultimately decided the case. 
